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RESPONSE

SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS AS PUBLIC LAW

JAMES D. COX

†

In response to William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political
Economy of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (2011).
1

The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market provides a wide-ranging
criticism of and thoughtful reforms for securities class actions. In
broad overview, Professors William Bratton and Michael Wachter
would restrict securities class actions to nondiversified information
traders and ramp up SEC enforcement efforts. However, both their
critique of contemporary class actions and their model of the reforms
they propose leave unexamined a good many matters relevant to both
the criticism and reform of securities class actions.
For some time now, shareholder suits have been a whipping boy
for what ails American capitalism. Bratton and Wachter earn high
marks for being less passionate and much more thoughtful than others in the chorus calling for reform; indeed, their observations are
among the most thoughtful to be found in this area. Nonetheless,
their analysis is incomplete in many important areas, and in addition
to the lacunae in their analysis, they commit an even more fundamental error by taking the narrow view that securities class actions have
2
only a private and not a public mission. To be sure, committing to
both a larger enforcement budget for the SEC and a mission to re†

Brainerd Currie Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. I am grateful
for the comments on an earlier draft by Professors Samuel Buell, Frank Partnoy, and
Randall Thomas. Errors in failing to follow their wise counsel are mine.
1
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the
Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69.
2
Id. at 133.
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dress private losses caused by fraudulent financial reporting would
make fraud enforcement more public than before. But this conjecture
assumes such enforcement would be as robust and frequent as presently
occurs with private suits. As will be seen, the checkered history of SEC
enforcement of market frauds belies such a hopeful outcome.
Bratton and Wachter do not start their critique with a solid foundation of developing the purpose that we might wish to serve with private, or for that matter government, suits prosecuting fraudulent financial reporting. We might simply conclude that everyone is against
fraud so that prosecution, either private or public, is desirable. But,
had they made this inquiry, Bratton and Wachter might well have
shortened their lengthy Article by omitting the titillating suggestion
that public companies and their stockholders would benefit from a
shareholder plebiscite on whether shareholders of that company can
3
seek private relief for any damage they might have suffered. Implicit
in the suggestion of such a shareholder plebiscite is the view that the
securities laws, and particularly their enforcement, are private and not
public law. Thus, one must look beyond this Article for a study that
begins with first principles and then progresses from there to a more
refined and nuanced investigation of how we might advance those
principles. Might we not just as easily defer to the shareholders on
other matters, such as whether they are a reporting company, whether
they will have an audit committee, and whether their annual reports
should be accompanied by management’s certification of the adequacy of internal controls and the auditor’s attestation to management’s
assessment? Some may not appreciate these requirements (perhaps
they are the same individuals who dislike seat belts or other mandated
safety features that increase the costs of their cars), but they are laws
that are public in the sense that they advance the view that perceived
social benefits are larger than the individual’s benefit derived from
making her own choice.
The securities laws carry out several public objectives in addition
4
to protecting the individual investor. Thus, the quality of U.S. securities laws is directly linked to the cost of capital. To be sure, investors

3

Id. at 129.
The commonly recognized objectives are: informing investors, enhancing allocational efficiency, reducing the frequency of fraudulent offerings of securities, heightening managerial responsiveness to owners, and reducing opportunistic behavior. See
James D. Cox, Coping in a Global Marketplace: Survival Strategies for a 75-Year Old SEC, 95
VA. L. REV. 941, 961-72 (2009) (reviewing the likely impact on each of these objectives
if differing disclosure standards apply in the same efficient market).
4
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could self-insure by imposing a higher discount rate in pricing the
shares of a firm opting out of the potential for fraud-on-the-market
suits as a means to correct, and even deter, fraudulent financial reporting. But this applies at the average level so that when the fraud
occurs, the shareholder—particularly one not well diversified—takes
the hit for the above-average loss. Moreover, the higher discount rate
5
would be systematic across all opting-out firms. This poses issues for
the United States generally, since one means of promoting U.S. capital markets has been the strength of our securities laws. To be sure,
U.S. capital markets do not enjoy the dominance they had twenty-five
years ago, but they still are attractive for domestic and foreign issuers
6
at a level that makes U.S. markets competitive. But the overall point
here is that Bratton and Wachter assume, without analysis, that the securities laws are part of the private law and have no connection with
more broadly based public welfare considerations.
Bratton and Wachter direct most of their complaints against securities class actions because they view this genre of suit as serving on7
ly a compensatory function. For some time I have asserted that
shareholder suits should not be so viewed. The point I first made
nearly thirty years ago has not changed, and it comes into bold relief
against the analysis of Bratton and Wachter: by characterizing the social calculus for evaluating the worth of all shareholder suits—whether
derivative or securities fraud litigation—as compensatory, commentators and the courts have guaranteed that such suits will not measure
8
up to their expected purpose. Complaints such as those set forth by
Bratton and Wachter—that the suits retrieve only a small portion of

5

See James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the “Chicago School,” 1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 639-40 (reviewing why private ordering in the context of insider trading results in higher systemic risk, and hence greater costs of capital, for all securities).
6
For a crisp assessment of the forces causing more foreign issuers to list closer to
their principal places of business, see Jim O’Neill & Sandra Lawson, Is Wall Street
Doomed?, in GOLDMAN SACHS, BRICS AND BEYOND 225 (2007), available at http://
www2.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/brics/brics-and-beyond-book-pdfs/bricsfull-book.pdf.
7
See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 1, at 84.
8
See generally James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L.
REV. 3 (1999) (identifying approaches courts should take to add a greater deterrence
function to private suits, including viewing their objective as deterrence and not compensation); see also James D. Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries
for Derivative Suit Procedures, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 745 (1984) (reviewing the impossibility of shareholder suits being understood to be compensatory).

COX FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

76

University of Pennsylvania Law Review PENNumbra

11/18/2011 12:14 PM

[Vol. 160:73
9

the damage caused by the fraudulent reporting—document this fear.
The collective loss of investors in a large capitalization firm for fraudulent reporting over three or five financial quarters is generally immense. Because in most instances the corporation and the responsible employees did not gain any amount approaching the sums
investors have lost, a judgment holding the corporation fully accountable would subject the corporation to debilitating liability. Instead of
focusing on the investors’ loss, we can focus on the purposes behind
proscriptions of financial-reporting fraud, thus shifting our focus to
the public objectives that can be served by the suit. Here we are aided
by the reasoning in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, which recognized that implied
private rights of action advance a public norm by allowing the suit’s
10
plaintiff (i.e., class counsel) to serve as a private attorney general.
With the compensatory orientation tightly under their belts, Bratton and Wachter take the predictable shot at securities class actions,
namely that the compensatory benefits of such suits are suspect because of the twin effects of circularity and the absence of net loss to
11
the well-diversified investor. Circularity arises when the ultimate sum
recovered flows from the corporate entity itself, such that, in the case
of fraud-induced investors acquiring the entity’s shares, the injured
investors are indirectly paying their own recovery. And, over time, the
well-diversified investors suffer no net loss because they will be winners
as frequently as they are losers, where “winning” and “losing” reflect
that the fraud’s impact on the share price bestows something of a
windfall to one side of the trade and a loss to the other side of the
trade. While not developed in their Article, presumably Bratton and
Wachter would allow recovery against the corporation if the corporation was itself trading with the investors, e.g., if it lied in the prospectus accompanying its public offering of securities or in the merger materials produced in the acquisition of another firm. So viewed, the
authors remove well-diversified investors from the class of investors
9

Judging whether suits recover a lot or a little vis-à-vis the class’s damages is particularly problematic because so many variables can affect stock prices during the period between the telling of the lie and the revealing of the truth. Indeed, plaintiffs and
defendants may begin their contest with wide-ranging estimates of the losses, but reality generally sets in for both as their settlement negotiations test their respective econometric models’ assumptions. Thus, any assertion that the resulting settlement is
larger or smaller in contrast to the investor losses is inherently whimsical.
10
377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (“Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a
necessary supplement to Commission action.”), abrogated by Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 576-77 (1979) (finding that the private right of action under
14(a) did not extend to all provisions of the 1934 Act).
11
See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 1, at 93-99.
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entitled to sue for securities fraud. Instead, they accord standing to
12
nondiversified investors deemed “information traders.” The informational traders are the opposite of the noise traders who just pile
onto publicly traded shares without digesting any information, including the false information, about the firm. On these points, we might
fault Bratton and Wachter for being too generous. They should have
eliminated all the investor suits. Why should it matter if you have one
trader flipping 100 quarters within one time period or one trader flipping 100 dimes over multiple time periods? In either case, the results
would be expected to be the same: heads about 50% of the time. That
is, if investors are repeat players in the market, over time they will have
the experience of selling at a price inflated by fraud and buying at a
price inflated by fraud. The well-diversified investor just gets to the average outcome more quickly. Should we base public policy on alacrity?
It is also not clear that we should penalize the noise trader or, for
that matter, the well-diversified investor. Each is behaving presumably
just as Bratton and Wachter would wish, namely according to the fundamental tenets of portfolio theory and the efficient market hypothesis. Noise traders neither read nor analyze. But they do trust the pricing of the market. Diversified investors understand that efficient
markets calibrate risk and return, and invest according to the individual security’s impact on the overall risk of the investor’s portfolio.
Thus, each places his trust in the market, but why should such trusting
investors be deprived of a right of action when their trust was misplaced? And, is it not possible that the diversified investor might have
invested less, or not at all, in that particular company if it had honestly
reported its results? Finally, we might ask why would we wish to remove the benefit of class action suits from fully diversified investors.
Might this just drive them to gerrymander their portfolio so as to qualify for class action treatment by narrowly falling out of the number of
stocks needed to be deemed diversified?
In fact, Bratton and Wachter may well have gone the full nine
yards and eliminated most securities class actions. To be sure, they
would preserve a private suit for nondiversified information traders
13
who can establish their reliance. But wait, wasn’t the whole point of
Basic Inc. v. Levinson that if reliance were required to be so estab-

12
13

Id. at 97-99.
Id. at 102.
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lished, then the suit could not be certified as a class action? When
one must show reliance, individual questions, not common questions,
predominate. It may well be that in any false reporting case the group
of relying, nondiversified investors would be sufficiently small so that
the burdens of probing the alleged reliance by each class member
would not render class action status inefficient. Yet uncertainty abounds regarding how common questions would be resolved in individual cases since this could depend on how many such investors
would qualify as informational nondiversified traders. Notwithstanding whether their claims can be aggregated, the question is really
whether the suit promises enough “honey” to attract the class counsel
bear. Thus, it may well be that limiting suits to only nondiversified information traders would ultimately mean that there would be few such
suits because they could not be aggregated to make the suit efficient
for the injured investors—or even if aggregated to that effect, the potential recovery may not be sufficient to attract counsel.
With regard to the circularity and portfolio arguments advanced
against securities fraud suits, why not raise the same problem when
there is a patent dispute between, for example, Advanced Micro Devices and Intel? Both of these large-cap firms enjoy a substantial institutional following. Why do we not just dismiss any private suit between two companies who are owned in some significant way by
diversified investors on the ground that there is no gain to their institutional owners that can flow from the suit? After all, patent and copyright infringement suits are a way of doing business in the technology
industries, and CalPERS is just as likely one day to own the shares of
an infringer as to own the shares of the infringed. Today, there is indeed an epidemic of expensive IP litigation. It may well be a net loss
to diversified investors. We do not cast these suits aside, regardless of
the investor pool of the suit’s combatants, because even though we
view patents and copyrights as being private property in light of the
rewards they confer on their owner, we also believe that these are
rights that advance our general welfare. Simply put, we as a nation
benefit from protecting investment in technology. Thus, there is a
distinct public law aspect to our willingness to sustain such suits despite the netting-out effects among their owners.
Thus, we see a big hole in the reasoning that underlies the critical
fulcrum of The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market’s reasoning that,
14

485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988) (noting that requiring “proof of individualized reliance” would effectively prevent class actions, because “individual issues then would
have overwhelmed the common ones”).
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in the case of the diversified investor, there is no value to the suit—a
conclusion reached because the Article never views the securities laws,
and particularly the proscription of fraudulent financial reporting, as
embodying public law that advances public welfare. That is, by enhancing compliance with disclosure requirements, the underlying ob15
jectives of our disclosure laws are furthered.
Bratton and Wachter favor SEC enforcement in place of private
enforcement. They support their reasoning by first disputing that
16
SEC enforcement resources are too limited and strengthen their
case by asserting that the differential in results achieved per dollar in17
vested is one-third less for private suits than public suits. The latter is
a back-of-the-envelope calculation in which Bratton and Wachter divide the funds recovered by the SEC in its enforcement actions during
the 1999–2009 period by the five-year (2004–2008) average enforcement budget, and then compare that ratio (4.35) with the quotient of
private settlements during the same period divided by the assumed
average 23% attorneys’ fees, yielding a higher 6.20 ratio. There are
multiple problems with this calculation. Their suggestions are open
to two broad criticisms, each addressed below.
A. Erroneous Accounting
There is a serious likelihood that this back-of-the-envelope calculation omits many costs, such that the SEC enforcement costs are substantially greater than calculated. First, the SEC’s enforcement efforts
span a good many areas; only a small number of its enforcement suits
in any year belong to the set out of which the type of violations for
which class action securities suits arise. Thus, for a meaningful calculation, the denominator in the calculation for public enforcement
needs to be slimmed considerably since only about one-half of the enforcement actions that the SEC initiates in any year are of the type
18
that has the potential to become a private class action. Also, the numerator should only include recoveries from enforcement actions of
the type that lends itself to class action treatment. With the numera-

15

See Cox, supra note 4, at 966-67 (arguing that disclosure rules increase manager
accountability).
16
See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 1, at 148.
17
Id. at 162.
18
See James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement Heuristics:
An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 750 (2003) (basing this estimate on SEC data
from 1997–2002).
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tor and denominator so adjusted, it is likely that the comparative advantage first calculated disappears.
Second, it is likely that the expenses the government incurs to
prosecute securities fraud are significantly greater than those reported
for the SEC’s enforcement budget standing alone. In fact, many of
the frauds prosecuted by the SEC in 2002 and 2003 were the result of
the efforts of many governmental bodies as well as self-regulatory organizations. For example, Enron and other large capitalization companies were the object of a strike force that included multiple gov19
ernment agencies.
Similarly, the massive $1.4 billion global
settlement against ten investment banking firms was the product of the
efforts of the New York Attorney General, the NASD and NYSE, and the
20
SEC. Thus, because it is common for enforcement agencies to work
together, a calculation of the costs of government enforcement in any
particular case needs to consider the costs borne by all government
agencies that are involved in that matter. The Bratton and Wachter data does not do this.
Third, the only systematic study comparing the targets of SEC enforcement actions with the targets of private suits unaccompanied by
parallel SEC enforcement action undermines the recommendation of
Bratton and Wachter. The first such comparative study of this question, which I completed with Professors Randall Thomas and Dana
21
Kiku, focused on settlements reached in the 1997–2002 period. The
data revealed that the SEC systematically targeted smaller firms, for
which investors suffered smaller provable losses, and that the targeted
firms were experiencing greater financial distress than were the firms
that undertook settlements in private suits unaccompanied by parallel
22
SEC action. A follow-up study focused on an expanded time period,
1990–2003, and divided the study to examine settlements in the post23
Enron period, 2002 and 2003. In this study, financial distress is sta-

19

See Kristen Hays, Task Force Prosecutors Prosper After Enron Case, HOUS. CHRON.,
Nov. 2, 2006, at C1 (profiling the prosecutors involved in the strike force).
20
See Press Release, Office of the N.Y. Attorney Gen., SEC, N.Y. Attorney Gen.,
NASD, NASAA, NYSE, and State Regulators Announce Historic Agreement to Reform
Inv. Practices (Dec. 20, 2002), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/
2002/dec/dec20b_02.html (detailing the terms of the settlement).
21
Cox, Thomas & Kiku, supra note 18, at 749.
22
Id. at 776-77.
23
See James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Dana Kiku, Public and Private Enforcement of the Securities Laws: Have Things Changed Since Enron?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
893, 899 (2005).
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24

tistically significant in identifying firms subject to SEC enforcement.
And for the 2002 and 2003 cases, the SEC appears to have shifted away
from a bias toward suits against firms experiencing financial distress,
preferring cases where investors suffered greater provable losses, albeit in firms that were smaller than those targeted in private suits
25
without a parallel SEC action.
Moreover, our review of SEC enforcement releases and Lexis-Nexis public reports of any SEC inquiry—investigation or enforcement action, a more sweeping category
than a formal enforcement action—finds such evidence in less than
26
19% of settled securities class actions. We strongly suspect that enforcement suits would be a small subpart of that percentage. In sum,
these data support the view that the SEC is an important, but only a
supporting, player in redressing on behalf of investors the damages
caused by fraudulent financial reporting.
Fourth, the above data support the view that the private suits
without SEC action challenge larger capitalized firms that are not experiencing financial distress. The risks of these suits is greater; suits
against such opponents mean that, because the firm is large and not
experiencing financial distress, the defendant will be a stronger opponent throughout the litigation. Accordingly, we would expect
greater rewards to the entrepreneurial lawyer. Thus, we should expect suits to entail a greater expense-to-benefit ratio when there is not
a parallel SEC action than when the SEC is the litigant.
Fifth, the SEC cause of action faces none of the hurdles that increases the costs of prosecuting a private suit. The SEC in prosecuting
27
its suits does not face a heightened pleading standard or the bar to
28
discovery that the private plaintiff must address before initiating suit.
Each of these innovations of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
29
Act of 1995 requires a substantial investment of resources by plaintiffs’ counsel that are not required when the SEC initiates suit. More24

Id. at 905.
Id. at 906.
26
See id. at 895, 900-01 tbls. 2 & 3 (2005) (reviewing 389 settlements reached from
1990 to 2003, in which there were reports of SEC involvement in 73 cases).
27
This requirement calls for the private plaintiff to allege scienter with particular facts, and those facts must give rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the requisite scienter. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-4(b)(2) (2006).
28
Id. at § 21D(b)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (staying discovery during any
pending motion to dismiss).
29
See Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
25
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over, to survive a motion to dismiss, the SEC is not required to allege
30
loss causation to recover. Private litigants must allege loss causation,
and in a fraud-on-the-market case this customarily requires expensive
econometric analysis to accompany the pleadings. Therefore, even
accepting that the authors’ back-of-the-envelope calculation was correctly made, we should not be surprised that private suits are more
costly than SEC enforcement actions. They clearly do cost more, as
the SEC and the private litigant face very different constraints in their
pursuits of justice. One might argue that this makes the case that the
SEC should be the plaintiff so as to circumvent the restrictions
placed on private suits by the Supreme Court and Congress. This
may well be the case, but we can ponder how long it would be the
case if the SEC were increasingly stepping forward to bring damage
actions on behalf of investors.
B. Institutional Constraints
Bratton and Wachter do not consider the institutional constraints
that would confront the SEC were it to assume the role of recovering
investor losses. The belief that an SEC enforcement action can provide all the relief that injured investors can expect from a class action
damages suit ignores the statutory constraints that surround SEC sanctions. Simply stated, the SEC is not empowered to recover the sums
investors lost because of the fraud. There is no statutory authority for
such recovery, and SEC sanctions and settlements are not framed by
the losses caused by a violation. With respect to monetary sanctions,
31
32
the SEC has the express and implied authority to require disgorgement of any gains the defendant derived from his violation. The
SEC also can extract fines, but there is a ceiling on the amount of the
33
fine per violation. Furthermore, any movement by the SEC toward

30

See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (holding that fraud on
the market requires not just allegations that the misrepresentation inflated the stock’s
price, but also evidence of loss causation once the untruthful statement became public).
31
See, e.g., § 21(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3) (permitting civil penalties in securities cases).
32
See, e.g., SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1229-32 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(awarding disgorgement remedy for violations of the early warning provisions of the
Williams Act).
33
See, e.g., § 21(d)(3)(B)(iii), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(iii) (setting the maximum
fine per violation at $500,000 for an entity and at $100,000 for an individual). To be
sure, SEC settlements frequently involve amounts greatly in excess of the issuer fine
ceiling of $500,000. This occurs when the SEC takes the position that the issuer and
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seeking “damages” suffered by the investor class would likely invite a
range of legal developments, many beyond its rulemaking authority.
At a minimum, any effort to recover investors’ losses would need congressional action since, as stated before, the securities laws not only do
not provide this authority, but also expressly provide that the mone34
tary sanction is a fine or disgorgement. Moreover, if damages are to
be recovered, then we would expect the same issues that private litigants face bearing on causation, and particularly loss causation, to
arise. The expected incorporation into such an SEC enforcement suit
of such a burdensome requirement would not likely endear these suits
to the staff at the SEC. If we believe—and it is not clear that Bratton
and Wachter do believe—that the SEC enforcement efforts are understaffed, then the additional burden of seeking damages on behalf
of injured investors raises doubts regarding just how eager the thin
enforcement staff will be to characterize their suits as seeking damages
as opposed to a fine and disgorgement, or less.
The above points at least qualify the optimism that Bratton and
Wachter express for the SEC’s ability to fill any void created by shareholders opting for SEC enforcement over private enforcement. These
points also raise issues that may be dispositive for reasonable shareholders deciding whether to give up their private suit and to look to
the SEC to seek recovery should they someday be defrauded.
Bratton and Wachter raise legitimate questions about the deterrent effects of securities class actions where the norm is that a settlement is paid solely by the corporation and not by the individuals who
are responsible for the defalcation. Unfortunately, the authors appear to accept the status quo, i.e., entity recovery, and do not address
how we can move toward holding individuals responsible. In failing to
engage this issue, they tacitly reflect the reality of today’s antifraud litigation: corporations pay and individual wrongdoers get a pass. This
35
truism is now supported by three Supreme Court decisions. In comothers have committed multiple violations. Nonetheless, the amount reached in such
settlements is not anchored to the amount of investor losses suffered.
34
Indeed, the natural implication of the “fair funds” provision of section
308(9)(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act appears to bar implicitly any action for damages
by the SEC. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 308(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (“[T]he amount
of such civil penalty shall . . . become part of the disgorgement fund for the benefit of
the victims of such violation.”). This provision provides that the SEC can, whenever
there is disgorgement recovered from a respondent in an enforcement action, dedicate the sum so recovered, plus any fine, to a fund to be returned to injured investors.
35
See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2305
(2011) (holding that an investment advisor who prepared a prospectus for a family
fund was not responsible for misrepresentations appearing in the prospectus); Stone-
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bination, they demand that the investor, at the time of trading, be
able to attribute the false statement to the individual defendant. Thus
we find the following is well engrained in the law: if the false statement is conceived and drafted by the defendant, but does not bear
the defendant’s name or otherwise identify the defendant as its maker,
then the defendant is not a primary participant and, hence, has no responsibility to the defrauded investor.
Our own work, published in this journal, points to the perverse
conundrum that the Supreme Court has created:
[A]fter settlement [of a securities class action], defendant firms experience liquidity problems, as well as worsening Altman’s Z-scores. Here,
the distinction between causation and correlation is important. For example, do our findings regarding the deterioration of the Altman’s Zscores suggest that settlements drive firms toward financial distress (i.e.,
settlements are causally related to the worsening situation), or do they
suggest that the financial deterioration in earlier time periods continues
downward regardless of the settlement or its size (i.e., settlements are
merely correlated with weakening financial performance), or do they
represent some combination of both? . . .

....
. . . Although uncertainty persists about the precise connection between
settlements and financial distress, there is no uncertainty that firms involved in securities class action litigation experience statistically greater

ridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 166-67 (2008) (holding that a corporation’s executives who knowingly prepared false documents to conceal from their customer’s auditors that $17 million in the customer’s revenues were
fraudulent roundtrip transactions, and did so to retain the customer as a client, were
not responsible to investors who purchased the customer’s shares at prices inflated due
to the fraudulent roundtrip transactions); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (holding, broadly, that there is no aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act); see also Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. v.
Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144, 149, 161 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that an outside lawyer who on seventeen different occasions engineered on behalf of the client, Refco,
fraudulent sham transactions for the purpose of concealing in various offering documents that Refco had massive trading losses and was unable to repay millions of dollars
due on margin was not liable as a primary participant to investors who suffered significant losses upon the ultimate bankruptcy of Refco); Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686,
698 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the president of a newspaper subsidiary who fraudulently overstated the number of subscribers and revenues for the subsidiary was not
liable to those who purchased the parent company’s shares at inflated prices even
though the president’s misstatements were incorporated into the consolidated financial statements issued by the parent); In re Nature’s Sunshine Prods. Sec. Litig., 486 F.
Supp. 2d 1301, 1311-12 (D. Utah 2008) (finding that plaintiffs failed to state a claim
because defendant CEO, who had falsely represented company financial data to an
auditor to obtain a “clean” audit, did not make statements publicly).
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risks of financial distress than their cohort firms. Since the burdens of
ongoing embroilment in securities class action contribute to the firm
experiencing value-decreasing pressures, our findings lend strong support for the view that such suits are better directed toward the officers,
advisors, and other individuals who bear responsibility for the fraudulent
representation(s) that spawned the suit. . . .
. . . The Supreme Court’s narrow view of who is subject to primary liability under the SEC’s antifraud provision has prompted the lower courts to
repeatedly reach results at odds with imposing just deserts on violators. . . . In the wake of such decisions, the focus on entity liability is likely to continue, and just deserts are likely to remain an unfulfilled public
36
policy objective . . . .

In such a world, deterrence is not likely. If not, can justice be
served by recoveries that reach only the corporation’s treasury or insurance policy? This may be the ultimate point behind The Political
Economy of Fraud on the Market. That is, without a legal process that will
reach the assets of those responsible for the lie, cynicism for the entire
process sets in and we lose interest in thinking about who, if anyone,
was harmed and how we might best construct a process for compensating for any such harm. Thus, Bratton and Wachter are rightly cynical. But the answer to such cynicism is to focus on first principles:
who should be financially responsible for false financial reporting.
Perhaps, having stuck their toes in the water of securities litigation,
they might next address this question, and in doing so, consider some
of the lacunae identified above.

Preferred Citation: James D. Cox, Response, Scurities Class Actions as
Public Law, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 73 (2011), http://www.
pennumbra.com/responses/11-2011/Cox.pdf.

36

Lynn Bai, James D. Cox, & Randall S. Thomas, Lying and Getting Caught: An Empirical Study of the Effect of Securities Class Action Settlements on Targeted Firms, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 1877, 1912-14 (2010).

